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Abstract 
While separate pieces of research found parents offer toddlers cues to express that they are 
(1) joking and (2) pretending, and that toddlers and preschoolers understand intentions to (1) 
joke and (2) pretend, it is not yet clear whether parents and toddlers consider joking and 
pretending to be distinct concepts. This is important as distinguishing these two forms of non-
literal acts could open a gateway to understanding the complexities of the non-literal world, 
as well as the complexities of intentions in general. Two studies found parents offer explicit 
cues to help 16- to 24-month-olds distinguish pretending and joking. Across an action play 
study (N=25) and a verbal play study (N=40) parents showed more disbelief and less belief 
through their actions and language when joking versus pretending. Similarly, toddlers 
showed less belief through their actions, and older toddlers showed less belief through their 
language7RGGOHUV¶GLVEHOLHI could be accounted for by their response to parents¶ language 
and actions. Thus these studies reveal a mechanism by which toddlers learn to distinguish 
joking and pretending. Parents offer explicit cues to distinguish these intentions, and toddlers 
use these cues to guide their own behaviors, which in turn allows toddlers to distinguish these 
intentional contexts. 
Keywords: Non-literal; Pretend; Humor; Parent-child interaction; Cues 
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Parents Produce Explicit Cues which Help Toddlers Distinguish Joking and Pretending 
Human life is permeated with social institutions with conventional and normative 
structures. In order to participate in collective activities, children must learn how to act within 
these settings. One interesting question is how children differentiate violations of normative 
rules.  This is an important, yet difficult concept required to both understand and distinguish 
humor, pretense, lying, false belief, and metaphor (Hoicka & Gattis, 2008; Hoicka, Jutsum, & 
Gattis, 2008; Leekam, 1991).  
While some accounts suggest children possess an innate capacity to understand 
RWKHUV¶SUHWHQVHDQGIDOVHEHOLHIVHJ, Leslie, 1987), such accounts do not explain how 
children distinguish when someone is pretending versus joking, or even following 
convention. For example, how do we use telephones? We could speak into it when someone 
is on the other end (literal). We could speak into it when no one is listening (pretending). We 
could put the receiver on our foot and speak (joking). To an adult, the act in and of itself may 
distinguish whether someone intends to joke, pretend, or be literal. However, for toddlers still 
learning about objects, it may not be clear which act follows which intention. If they have 
little experience with telephones, any act could be considered literal. Even with experience, 
the pretend act could be seen as joking LW¶VVLOO\WRWDONWRQRRQHDQGWKHKXPRURXVDFW
could be seen as pretending (she's pretending her foot is her ear). It is thus plausible that 
parents give additional cues to help toddlers distinguish amongst various types of 
communicative intentions.  
We have many conventions across languages and cultures, including uses of words 
and objects Searle (1969, 2005). For instance, in English the class of animal that has wings, a 
beak, layVHJJVDQGXVXDOO\IOLHVLVFRQYHQWLRQDOO\UHIHUUHGWRDV³ELUG´ However in 
)UHQFKWKHFRQYHQWLRQLVWRFDOOLW³RLVHDX´ In terms of objects, we conventionally use knives 
to cut things, and we conventionally use paper and metal (money) in exchange for goods and 
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services. One way in which parents might distinguish intentions to joke and pretend is to 
highlight that joking should be viewed as breaking convention to a greater extent than 
pretending. Thus parents might show more disbelief and less belief when joking versus 
pretending. We propose this because, first, theoretically, joking, at its most basic in early 
development, is intended to break convention (e.g., Hoicka & Gattis, 2008; Hoicka, et al., 
2008). )RULQVWDQFHLISXWWLQJDERRWRQRQH¶VKDQGto joke, all that is necessary to appreciate 
the joke is to understand that that is not where the boot conventionally goes. It is not 
necessary to imagine the boot is a glove, and to do so may take away from the humor. In 
contrast, while pretending technically breaks conventions, in the landscape of another 
SRVVLEOHZRUOGRURQH¶VLPDJLQDWLRQQRFRQYHQWLRQVKDYHEHHQEURNHQ (e.g., Nichols & 
Stich, 2003). Thus if pretending that a block is a sandwich, it would be necessary to allow 
logical conventional FRQVHTXHQFHVRIWKLVK\SRWKHWLFDOVLWXDWLRQVXFKDV³HDWLQJ´WKHEORFN
7KXVSXWWLQJDEORFNWRRQH¶VPRXWKZRXOGEHconventional given the assumption that it is a 
sandwich. Therefore pretending must be conventional given some assumptions. Joking does 
not have this requirement. 
Additionally, past research suggests parents give toddlers different input when joking 
versus pretending. When parents read a humorous versus literal book to their toddlers, they 
produced more disbelief language (Hoicka, et al., 2008). For example, if parents read funny 
book pages VXFKDV³7KHGXFNVVD\PRR.´WKH\ZRXOGWKHQSURGXFHGLVEHOLHIlanguage such 
DV³'XFNVDUHVXSSRVHGWRVD\TXDFN.´VXJJHVWLQJWRGGOHUVVKRXOGUHMHFWWKHSULRUVentence. 
7KLVLVIXUWKHUVXSSRUWHGE\SDUHQWV¶ production of rising intonation contours when joking, 
expressing questioning or contradiction (Hoicka & Gattis, 2012). Thus when joking, parents 
offer cues to suggest toddlers should disbelieve the information, which could help toddlers 
reject the information contained in the joke. However, the above studies have not considered 
whether parents also offer cues expressing belief when joking. 
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In contrast, parents may encourage belief in pretend acts. When parents pretended 
versus acted literally (e.g., pretend to eat and drink versus really eat and drink), parents 
produced more words of the absent object in the pretend scenario (i.e., cheerios, juice; 
Lillard, et al., 2007; Lillard & Witherington, 2004). Parents also produced more movements 
related to eating and drinking when pretending, such as eating, drinking, pouring, and serving 
(Lillard, et al., 2007; Lillard & Witherington, 2004). Thus parents may encourage children to 
believe their pretend act does follow convention, at least in an imaginary space. Additionally, 
experimental evidence shows that rather than reject information learnt in a pretend context, 3- 
and 4-year-olds generalize that information to the real world (Sutherland & Friedman, 2012). 
However, the goal of this body of research was not to determine whether parents expressed 
belief to cue pretending. Furthermore, disbelief has not been analyzed in the context of 
SUHWHQGLQJ)LQDOO\SDUHQWV¶cues to joking and pretending have not been directly compared, 
leaving the possibility open that parents do not mark these behaviors distinctively. 
In the following studies, parents acted out scripted jokes, pretending, and literal play 
for their toddlers. It is possible for joking and pretending to overlap. For instance, one could 
pretend that a bucket is a hat, and also find it funny. However, as the above research shows, 
joking and pretending often do not overlap, and have different underlying definitions. It is the 
difference that this study aims to focus on. Therefore, jokes were designed to resemble 
prototypical jokes in early development, and, importantly, not to look like pretense. 
Similarly, pretending was designed to resemble prototypical pretense in early development, 
and, importantly, not to look like jokes. This was to ensure the studies captured the essence of 
joking and pretending without confounding the two. We examined parentV¶ production of 
belief and disbelief language and actions during joking, pretending and literal play, based on 
previously-researched parental cues (e.g., Hoicka et al., 2008; Lillard, et al., 2007; Lillard & 
Witherington, 2004). For instance, if saying an object is a shoe, one could show belief by 
RUNNING HEAD: DISTINGUISHING JOKING AND PRETENDING  6 
 
saying, ³,WJRHVRQ\RXUIRRW.´RUSXWWLQJWKHobject RQRQH¶VIRRW,QFRQWUDVWRQHFRXOGVKRZ
disbelieIE\VD\LQJ³7KDW¶VQRWDVKRH.´or performing an action that does not go with shoes, 
e.g., putting the object RQRQH¶VKHDG. 
When joking versus pretending, we expected parents to show more disbelief, and less 
belief belief, through language and actions, reflecting the above definitions of joking and 
pretending (e.g., Hoicka, et al., 2008; Nichols & Stich, 2003). Because less is known about 
pretending in relation to belief, there are several possible predictions regarding how parents 
might express pretending versus literal play. When pretending versus playing literally, we 
predict parents would either: show more disbelief as the acts technically break convention 
(e.g., Hoicka, et al., 2008); show less belief as previous research suggests (e.g., Lillard, et al., 
2007; Lillard & Witherington, 2004); show no difference as pretending might be thought of 
as literal once the pretend context is established (Nichols & Stich, 2003; Sutherland & 
Friedman, 2012); or a combination of differences in both directions as pretense both breaks 
conventions (technically) and follows FRQYHQWLRQLQRQH¶VLPDJLQDWLRQ at the same time 
(e.g., Hoicka, et al., 2008;  Nichols & Stich, 2003).  
We examined WRGGOHUV¶actions, as 1-year-olds have a good grasp of actions (e.g., 
Hunnius & Bekkering, 2010). Since 1-year-olds are still developing their vocabularies (e.g., 
Hamilton, Plunkett, & Schafer, 2000), and as toddlers begin to master the production of 
negation towards their second birthday (Choi, 1988; Hummer, Wimmer, & Antes, 1993), we 
examined a simplified version of their verbal responses, focusing on their production of 
QHJDWLRQHJ³1R´ We expected toddlers to distinguish joke, pretend, and literal contexts 
as parents did, and to show markers of belief (i.e., actions showing belief) shortly after 
parents expressed belief, and markers of disbelief (i.e., negation, actions showing disbelief) 
shortly after parents expressed disbelief. This would reveal a mechanism through which 
toddlers learn to distinguish joke, pretend, and literal contexts. 
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Study 1 
Parents were instructed to produce specific, scripted, action-based joking, pretending, 
and literal play with their 16- to 20-month-olds, which were all tied to the same target 
sentences. This was to ensure that actions and utterances relating to the target sentences could 
be directly compared, allowing experimental control. Jokes involved misusing objects (e.g., 
food on head) corresponding with the first stage of humor development (McGhee, 1979), 
which is understood from 15 months (Hoicka & Wang, 2011), and produced from 15 months 
/RL]RX3UHWHQGLQJLQFOXGHGV\PEROLFSUHWHQVHHJ³ZDVKLQJKDQGV´ZLWKRXWVRDS
or water), which is understood from 15 months (e.g., Bosco, Friedman, & Leslie, 2006), and 
produced from 15-18 months (e.g., McCune-Nicholich, 1981); and object substitution (e.g., 
pretending a round sponge is a hat), which is understood from 15 months when the substitute 
has a similar look or form to the original (e.g., Onishi, Baillargeon, & Leslie, 2007). 
Therefore these types of joking and pretending ZHUHFKRVHQWRPDWFKWRGGOHUV¶VWDJHRI
development, making the study as naturalistic as possible. 
Method 
Participants. Twenty-five parents (1 father) and their toddlers (M = 17 months, 12 
days, range = 16 months, 0 days to 20 months 1 day; 13 boys) participated. Another 5 
participants were excluded because children refused to participate. All children were 
Caucasian. Most parents had a university degree. Participants were recruited through parent 
and toddler activities, and advertising through posters, facebook, and parenting websites. 
Materials. Objects for the washing scenarios included a washing-up bin, water, liquid 
soap bottles, liquid soap, sponges, and cloths. Objects for the dressing scenarios included 
hats, scarves, gloves, plastic envelopes, a round sponge, and a long plastic tube. Objects for 
the eating scenarios included small cookies, pieces of rice cakes, water, orange drink, a clear 
plastic bottle, a clear plastic cup, and a plate. Objects for the coloring scenarios included 
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papers with shape outlines, crayons, and sticks. Two Sony digital camcorders recorded the 
sessions. 
Design. This was a within subjects. For the main analysese, the independent variable 
was the Action Type for each trial: Joke, Pretend, or Literal. The dependent variables 
LQFOXGHGSDUHQWV¶%HOLHIDQG'LVEHOLHI/DQJXDJHFKLOGUHQ¶V1HJDWLRQDQGSDUHQWV¶DQG
FKLOGUHQ¶V7DUJHW$FWLRQVTwo other independent variables were examined for whether they 
LQWHUDFWHGZLWKWKHPDLQLQGHSHQGHQWYDULDEOHFKLOGUHQ¶VDJHDQGW\SHRISUHWHQGLQJ
(symbolic, object substitution). For the lag sequential analyses (LSA) examining the effects 
RISDUHQWFXHVRQFKLOGUHQ¶VEHKDYLRUV the independent variables were the parent dependent 
variables listed above, as well as Other Actions as a control for Target Actions. The 
dependent variables were the child dependent variables listed above, as well as Other Actions 
as a Control for Target Actions, and Other Language as a control for Negation. For the LSA 
H[DPLQLQJWKHHIIHFWVRIFKLOGUHQ¶VFXHVRQSDUHQWV¶EHKDYLRUVthe independent and 
dependent variables were reversed. See next section for counter-balancing. 
Procedure and Counter-Balancing. Before the study, parents were only told that we 
were interested in discovering how parents and toddlers interact when playing, including 
when they joke and pretend. Therefore the hypotheses were not disclosed. Each parent and 
toddler sat at a table, with the parent in a chair, and the toddler in a high chair. Parents acted 
out four trials for two minutes each: Joke, Pretend, Literal, and a fourth literal trial run for 
another study (a neutral control for a study examining smiling and acoustics). At the 
EHJLQQLQJRI/LWHUDOWULDOVSDUHQWVZHUHWROG³6KRZ\RXUH[FLWHPHQWDQGKDSSLQHVV«´ (e.g., 
³DERXWKDYLQJDVSHFLDOWUHDW´ At the beginning of Pretend trialsSDUHQWVZHUHWROG³<RXDUH
JRLQJWRSUHWHQGWKDW«´HJ³\RX¶UHHDWLQJDQGGULQNLQJZLWK\RXUFKLOG´ At the 
EHJLQQLQJRI-RNHWULDOVSDUHQWVZHUHWROG³8VHWKHREMHFWVWKHZURQJZD\WRPDNHMRNHV
with your child.´Children could have heard these general instructions, however it seems 
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XQOLNHO\WKDWWKH\ZRXOGVKRZDJUHDWHUHIIHFWWKDQSDUHQWV¶LQWHUDFWLRQVWKHPVHOYHV We 
chose to instruct parents to show their excitement and happiness in the Literal condition to 
control for positive emotion across conditions. If parents took the literal task seriously, then 
differences between the Literal and Pretend conditions may be due to the fact that parents and 
children were playing, and therefore more positive, in the pretend condition, rather than due 
to the fact that the pretend context was non-literal (see Hoicka & Akhtar, 2011). 
Each trial had three Target Sentences paired with Target Actions that parents could 
say and act out at any point during the trials. The Target Sentences were the same across 
Action Type (Joke, Pretend, Literal), but Target Actions varied across Action Types (see 
Appendix A for all pairings). Parents said each of three Target Sentences (e.g., in the Eating 
WULDO³,¶PJRLQJWRKDYHDGULQN.´DQGDFWHGRXWone of the corresponding actions (e.g., 
Literal: drink from cup; Pretend: put empty cup to mouth; Joke: put cup of water to elbow).  
The actions were described on paper, with an accompanying photo in the Joke trials. 
We chose not to include an accompanying photo for the Literal and Pretend trials because the 
actions chosen were conventional and well-known, even if the objects differed. For example, 
if a parent was asked to pretend to drink from an empty cup, the action itself is easy to 
identify. However, the joke actions did not necessarily correspond to conventional actions, 
e.g., we do not typically put anything to our elbow, including a cup of water. Therefore we 
used a photo to ensure parents understood the task, and to make performance as similar as 
possible across the Joke trials. Additionally, two Pretend trials involved symbolic pretense 
(Washing, Eating), while two Pretend trials involved object substitution pretense (Dressing, 
Coloring). In contrast, all the Joke trials involved misusing objects, and all the literal trials 
were literal. 
Target Sentences were the same across trials to allow experimental control ± any 
differences in responses by parents and children would be attributed to how the Target 
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Actions related to the Target Sentences, and could not be attributed to the Target Sentences 
alone. While using specific sentences and actions gave better experimental control, it may 
have made the study less naturalistic. However, this was deemed necessary to avoid 
confounds, and parents appeared to act naturally throughout the study regardless. Since these 
instructions were printed on paper kept away from the child, children only learned about this 
information through their parents. Additionally, it was necessary to use different objects 
across trials. For instance, if we had used gloves in all three conditions, it would be difficult 
for a parent to pretend to put on the glove if it really was a glove ± this would lead them to 
literally putting on a glove. Thus we chose, in this instance, plastic envelopes so that parents 
could actually pretend. Additionally, we made the literal items more exciting in the Literal 
trials to increase positive affect in the Literal condition so that it would be as emotionally 
positive and engaging as the other two playful conditions. 
Joke, Pretend, Literal, and the other literal trial types were crossed with Washing, 
Eating, Dressing, and Coloring scenarios (see Appendix A for all scenarios). For example, 
one parent would act out joke washing (e.g., putting foam on nose instead of hands), then 
literal (not analyzed) eating (e.g., eating rice cakes), then literal (analyzed) dressing (e.g., 
putting hat on head), and then pretend coloring (e.g., moving sticks on paper). However 
another parent would act out pretend eating (e.g., moving fingers from plate to mouth, 
without food), then literal (analyzed) coloring (e.g., coloring with crayons on paper), then 
literal (not analyzed) washing (e.g., wash hands with soap and water), then joke dressing 
(e.g., putting hat under arm; see Appendix B for counterbalancing). This was to ensure there 
was no carry-over from one trial to the next. For instance, if a parent joked they were 
drinking on one trial, and on the next trial, literally drank, parents and toddlers might return 
to the joke drinking if they thought it was fun, and not distinguish the contexts. Parents and 
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children played with distractor objects (hammer bench, xylophone, ring stacker, one per trial, 
in that order) for one minute between trials. 
Parents were not told to make, or refrain from making, additional actions or 
utterances. Children played with objects with their parents throughout the trials. The 
experimenter sat behind an occluder during the trials, and switched the objects between trials. 
Coding. Videos were coded and transcribed XVLQJ2EVHUYHUVRIWZDUH$OOSDUHQWV¶
utterances were coded throughout the trials as Target Sentences (the first time parents said a 
sentence we asked parents to say), or Belief Language, Disbelief Language, or Neither, in 
relation to the three Target Sentences (see Table 1 for examples of Belief and Disbelief 
Language across categories).  
Belief Language could show: 
1. General belief: e.g., for the Target Sentence, ³,¶PSXWWLQJWKHJORYHRQP\KDQG.´ 
General Belief Language FRXOGEH³7KDW¶VULJKW´ which confirms any sentence. 
2. Specific belief: e.g., for the Target Sentence ³,¶PSXWWLQJWKHJORYHRQP\KDQG´ 
Specific Belief Language could involve repeating the original Target Sentence, or 
re-wording the original Target Sentence, e.g., ³,¶PJHWWLQJmy gloves on.´ 
3. Build-on belief: e.g., for the Target Sentence, ³,¶PSXWWLQJWKHJORYHRQP\KDQG´ 
adding to the description beyond the Target Sentence so as to show belief in the 
premise, HJ³These will keep me nice and warm´ RU³'RHVP\JORYHILW
nicHO\"´  
 
Disbelief Language (Hoicka, et al., 2008) could show: 
1. General disbelief: e.g., for the Target Sentence, ³,¶PSXWWLQJWKHJORYHRQP\
hand.´ General Disbelief Language FRXOGEH³7KDW¶VZURQJ.´ZKLFKGHQLHVDQ\
sentence. 
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2. Specific disbelief: e.g., for the Target Sentence ³,¶PSXWWLQJWKHJORYHRQP\
hand´ Specific Disbelief Language would involve re-wording the original 
statement to show that it breaks conventionHJ³7KDW¶VQRWKRZ\RXSXW\RXU
gloves on your hands.´RU, ³$P,SXWWLQJWKHJORYHRQP\KDQG"´ 
3. Build-on disbelief: e.g., for the Target Sentence, ³,¶PSXWWLQJWKHJORYHRQP\
hand´adding to the description beyond the Target Sentence so as to show 
disbelief in the premise, HJ³7KLVLVUHDOO\DSODVWLFHQYelope on my hand.´ 
Belief and Disbelief Language had to refer to the Target Sentence, not just elements 
in the Target SHQWHQFH6RIRUH[DPSOH³,KDYHILYHILQJHUV.´ZRXOGQRWFRXQWDVBelief 
Language as LWLVQRWDERXWRQH¶VKDQGLQUHODWLRQWRWKHJORYH4XHVWLRQVZHUHFRXQWHG as 
%HOLHI/DQJXDJHZKHQWKHSUHPLVHRIWKH7DUJHW6HQWHQFHZDVDVVXPHG)RUH[DPSOH³'RHV
P\JORYHILWQLFHO\"´ZRXOGVXJJHVWWKH\KDYHDFFHSWHGWKDWWKH\DUHZHDULQJWKHJORYH,I
instead the parent asked, ³$P,SXWWLQJWKHJORYHRQP\KDQG"´then this question would 
suggest disbelief in the initial premise (that they were putting a glove on their hand) and so 
would instead by coded as Disbelief Language. 
 
Table 1 
Examples of Belief and Disbelief Language and Actions across Studies. 
 Study 1 Study 2 
Target Sentence ,¶PJRLQJWRHDWWKLV This is a train. 
Belief Language   
  General -7KDW¶VULJKWFOHYHUER\>DIWHU
child does eating action] 
-7KDW¶VULJKW>DIWHUVD\LQJ³FKRR
FKRR´@ 
  Specific -,¶PJRLQJto eat this [repetition] 
-Look, Mummy is going to eat this 
-This is a train [repetition] 
-I think it is a train, darling [re-
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[re-wording]  wording] 
  Build-on - Is this a plate to put our food on? 
[builds on assumption they are 
eating] 
-What noise does a train make 
[builds on assumption it is a 
train] 
Disbelief 
Language 
  
  General -7KDW¶VQRWZKDW\RXGR>JHQHUDO
rejection of the premise they are 
eating] 
-<RXGRQ¶WEHOLHYHPHGR\RX"
[general rejection of the premise 
LW¶VDWUDLQ] 
  Specific -Is there food on the plate? 
[questions whether really eating] 
Is that a train? [questions 
whether it really is a train] 
  Build-on -We don't eat on your forehead do 
we? 
[questions whether eating 
correctly] 
None found, but a hypothetical 
example is: 
-%XWLWGRHVQ¶WKDYHZKHHOV
[indirectly questions whether 
really a train] 
Belief Action  Moves forward on table [uses 
object like a train] 
Disbelief Action  Lifts to mouth [uses object as 
though it were not a train] 
 
Language was coded as Neither if it did not fall within the definitions above, i.e., if 
the utterance was not about the Target Sentence. This could occur if parents made unrelated 
utterances (e.g., cKLOG¶VEHKDYLRURUVDLGRWKHU things about the objects, but not about the 
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Target Sentences themselves. &KLOGUHQ¶V1HJDWLRQQRQRWHWFDQG3DUHQWV¶DQGFKLOGUHQ¶V
Target Actions (the actions we asked parents to model) were coded throughout each trial.  
A second-coder, blind to the VWXG\¶Vhypotheses, coded four transcripts (16%) for 
SDUHQWV¶ODQJXDJHFRGLQJHYHU\utterance as Belief Language, Disbelief Language, Target 
Sentence, or Other. Agreement was very good, k  $JUHHPHQWIRUFKLOG¶V1HJDWLRQZDV
not coded as word searches on the transcripts were used. Four videos (16%) were coded for 
SDUHQWV¶DQGFKLOGUHQ¶VDFWLRQVFRGLQJHDFKDFWLRQDVD7DUJHW$FWLRQRUQRW$JUHHPHQWZDV
very good, k = 0.83. 
Results and Discussion 
One parent and child did not complete the Pretend trial, however they completed the 
Joke and Literal trials, so these trials were kept in the analyses. We used linear mixed models 
/00WRDQDO\]HDOOSDUHQWV¶EHKDYLRUVDQGFKLOGUHQ¶V7DUJHWActions. These are similar to 
repeated-measures ANOVA, but have the added benefit of allowing the inclusion of 
participants with missing data, and for controlling for Scenario, while increasing power by 
analyzing by item instead of by participant. 
We used Logit Mixed Effects Models (LMEM) IRUFKLOGUHQ¶V1HJDWLRQDVWKHPHDQ
number of occurrences of the behavior was under one for each trial, thus we needed to use 
non-parametric statistics. LMEM allow repeated-measures non-parametric designs with 
missing data, and to control for random effects, while increasing power by analyzing by item 
instead of by participant (see Hoicka & Akhtar, 2011, and Jaeger, 2008, for more details). For 
all analyses, our Independent Variable was Action Type (Joke, Pretend, Literal). Difference 
contrasts compared Pretend to Joke and Literal trials; we checked for specific differences 
between Pretend and Joke trials, and between Pretend and Literal trials. This was because 
these were the two contrasts we were interested in (see introduction), and because, 
statistically, one can only run the (number of conditions-1), i.e., in this case, 2 contrasts. For 
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all analyses, Participant Number and Scenario were assigned as random variables. 
Interactions between Action Type and Child Gender, Child Age (<18 months; >18 months 
for LMEM based on median), and Pretense Type (Symbolic, Object Substitution) were 
included in models if significant. For Pretense Type, two Pretend trials involved Symbolic 
Pretense (Washing, Eating), while two Pretend trials involved Object Substitution Pretense 
(Dressing, Coloring). Therefore the distinction of Pretense Type is meaningful for the 
Pretense trials. However, in the Joke condition, all trials (Washing, Eating, Dressing, 
Coloring) involved Misusing Objects. Similarly, in the Literal condition, all trials were 
equally literal. Therefore the distinction of Pretense Type is not meaningful for the Joke or 
Literal trials since it does not distinguish the types of joking or literalness. Therefore the 
inclusion of Pretense Type only helps us better understand how parents might distinguish 
different types of pretending. 
Parents 
Language. Figure 1 VKRZV3DUHQWV¶%HOLHIDQG'LVEHOLHILanguage by Action Type 
(Joke, Pretend, Literal), and Pretense Type (Symbolic, Object Substitution; for Belief 
Language only). The best model, loglik = -458.90, N = 148, Pseudo-R2 = 0.66, found 3-way 
interactions between Belief Type, Action Type (Joke, Pretend), and Pretense Type, OR = 
7.07*e-6, t = -2.75, p = .0069; and between Belief Type, Action Type (Pretend, Literal), and 
Pretense Type, OR = 26903, t = 2.34, p = .0208. There were no significant interactions with 
Child Age or Child Gender. 
To follow up the interactions, we analyzed Belief and Disbelief Language separately. 
The best model for Belief Language, loglik = -250.81, N = 74, Pseudo-R2 = 0.22, found 
interactions between Action Type (Joke, Pretend), and Pretense Type, OR = 32827, t = 3.31, 
p = .0238, and between Action Type (Pretend, Literal), and Pretense Type, OR = 8400, t = 
2.19, p = .0320. To follow up the interactions, we tested Symbolic and Object Substitution 
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trials separately. During Symbolic trials, loglik = -123.39, N = 35, Pseudo-R2 = 0.15, Pretend 
trials elicited more Belief Language than Joke trials, OR = 2689, t = 2.44, p = .0205, and 
Literal trials, OR = 1249, t = 2.24, p = .0321. There was no difference between Action Types 
during the Object Substitution trials.  
 
 
* p ൑.051 
Figure 1. 3DUHQWV¶PHDQQXPEHURIutterances classified as Belief and Disbelief Language by 
Action Type (Joke, Pretend, Literal), with Belief Language further divided by 
Pretense Type (Symbolic, Object Substitution) in Study 1. Errors bars represent 
standard errors. 
 
The best model for Disbelief Language, loglik = -156.93, N = 74, Pseudo-R2 = 0.20, 
found Joke trials elicited marginally more Disbelief Language than Pretend trials, OR = 3.22, 
t = 1.99, p = .0510, and Pretend trials elicited significantly more Disbelief Language than 
Literal trials, OR = 3.57, t = 2.16, p = .0341. There was no interaction between Action Type 
and Pretense Type for Disbelief Language. 
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Parents produced more Belief than Disbelief Language overall, OR = 1.36*e7, t = 
18.57, p < .0001, regardless of Action Type. Symbolic (Dressing, Coloring) trials elicited 
more Disbelief than Belief Language compared to Object Substitution (Eating, Hand-
Washing) trials, regardless of Action Type, OR = 910.23, t = 3.85, p = .0002. 
Target Actions. The best model, loglik = -205.95, N = 74, Pseudo-R2 = 0.16, found 
Pretend trials (M = 10.54, SD = 4.58) elicited more Target Actions than Joke trials (M = 6.40, 
SD = 3.73), OR = 57.72, t = 4.20, p = .0001. There was no difference between the Pretend 
and Literal trials (M = 9.64, SD = 4.38). There were no significant interactions with Child 
Age, Child Gender, or Pretense Type. 
As predicted, parents showed more disbelief through their language, and less belief 
through their language and actions, when joking versus pretending. Parents showed more 
disbelief when pretending versus playing literally through their language. However, parents 
also showed more belief through their language during symbolic pretense versus literal play, 
but not during object substitution pretense versus literal play. This suggests that while object 
substitution pretending is seen only as breaking convention compared to literal acts, symbolic 
pretense is seen as both breaking and endorsing convention compared to literal acts.  
Interestingly, across all conditions, even in the joke condition, parents used more belief than 
disbelief language. Parents may thus have been keen to set up the joke and make sure their 
toddlers took note, before breaking the jokes down for their toddlers. Alternatively, it may be 
that parents refer more to reality even when joking and pretending, perhaps to maintain a 
general overall clarity of conversation, or because it is difficult to continually focus on the 
non-real. 
Children 
Negation. Children produced Negation on 1 of 25 Joke trials (4%), 5 of 24 Pretend 
trials (24%), and 3 of 25 Literal trials (12%). There was no difference between trial types 
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(Joke, Pretend, Literal). There were no significant interactions with Child Age, Child Gender, 
or Pretense Type. 
Target Actions. The best model, loglik = -186.65, N = 74, Pseudo-R2 = 0.29, found 
Pretend trials (M = 5.13, SD = 4.34) elicited more Target Actions than Joke trials (M = 0.40, 
SD = 0.82), OR = 61.93, t = 5.03, p < .0001. There was no difference between Pretend and 
Literal trials (M = 5.72, SD = 4.90). There were no significant interactions with Child Age, 
Child Gender, or Pretense Type. 
As predicted, like parents, children showed less belief through their actions when 
joking versus pretending, by producing fewer Target Actions. However, they did not show 
more disbelief through Negation. This may be because they were too young to use Negation 
(e.g., Choi, 1988; Hummer, et al., 1993). Alternatively, perhaps toddlers were unable to 
distinguish joking and pretending. However, this is less likely to be the case as they did 
distinguish joking and pretending through their Target Actions. 
Parent-Child Interactions 
In order to examine more closely how SDUHQWV¶FXHVSUHGLFWHGFKLOGUHQ¶VEHKDYLRUVa 
lag-sequential analysis (LSA) was run. This analysis allows one to determine which 
behaviors are more or less likely to follow other behaviors than chance within a large array of 
behaviors. See Bakeman and Gottman (1997), and Bakeman and Quera (1995), for detailed 
explanations of this analysis; or Montague, et al. (2011) for a concise introduction. We 
H[DPLQHGWKHHIIHFWVRISDUHQWV¶%HOLHIDQG'LVEHOLHILanguage DQGSDUHQWV¶7DUJHW$FWLRQV
on FKLOGUHQ¶V7DUJHW$FWLRQVDVWKHVHZHUHXVHGE\SDUHQWVDQGFKLOGUHQWRGLVWLQJXLVK
conditions. We collapsed Target Sentences with Belief Language as they both convey belief 
from the FKLOG¶VYLHZSRLQW. We also included SDUHQWV¶DQGFKLOGUHQ¶V2WKHU$FWLRns (non-
target actions) as controls for the Target Actions. We used a 5-second time lag (as actions are 
around 5 seconds long). Table 2 shows all frequencies, expected frequencies, conditional 
RUNNING HEAD: DISTINGUISHING JOKING AND PRETENDING  19 
 
probabilities, and adjusted residuals (AR) of each Behavior Type (e.g., Child Target Action) 
following each Behavior Type (e.g., Parent Belief Language) within 5 seconds, across all 
participants and conditions. The distribution of behaviors in Table 2 was significantly 
different than would be expected by chance alone, Ȥ2(8) = 30.49, p < .01. ARs greater or 
equal to 1.96 suggest one behavior follows another more often than chance would predict (p 
< .05), while ARs smaller or equal to -1.96 suggest one behavior follows another less often 
than chance.  
 
Table 2 
Observed frequencies (top row, no brackets), expected frequencies (top row, in brackets), 
conditional probabilities (middle row) and adjusted residuals (bottom row) RIWRGGOHUV¶
behavior types IROORZLQJSDUHQWV¶EHKDYLRUW\SHVZLWKLQVHFRQGVDFURVVall participants 
and conditions in Study 1. 
 Follows within 5 seconds 
 Child 
 Target Actions Other Actions 
Parent   
Belief Language 141(130) 
62% 
(2.13)* 
85(96) 
38% 
(-2.36)* 
Disbelief Language 11(13) 
50%  
(-0.79) 
11(9) 
50% 
(0.68) 
Target Actions 74(67) 
63% 
43(50) 
37% 
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(1.41) (-1.59) 
Other Actions 7(23) 
17% 
(-9.78)* 
33(17) 
83% 
(8.33)* 
*p < .05.  
Children were more likely to perform Target Actions than chance within 5 seconds of 
parents producing Belief Language, but less likely after parents performed Other Actions. 
Children were more likely to perform Other Actions after parents performed Other Actions, 
but less likely after parents produced Belief Language. This suggests that, as predicted, 
SDUHQWV¶H[SUHVVLRQRIEHOLHIHQFRXUDJHGFKLOGUHQWRVKRZEHOLHIDVZHOO+RZHYHUDJDLQVW
RXUSUHGLFWLRQVSDUHQWV¶H[SUHVVLRQRIGLVEHOLHIKDGQRimmediate effect on children. 
In order to examine whether child also influenced their parents, we examined the 
HIIHFWVRIFKLOGUHQ¶VEHKDYLRUVRQSDUHQWV¶EHKDYLRUV. The distribution of behaviors in Table 3 
was significantly different than would be expected by chance alone, Ȥ2(8) = 34.56, p < .01.  
Parents were more likely to perform Target Actions than chance within 5 seconds of 
children producing Target Actions, but less likely after children performed Other Actions. 
Parents were more likely to perform Other Actions after children performed Other Actions, 
but less likely after children performed Target Actions. 3DUHQWV¶ODQJXDJHZDVQRWDIIHFWHGE\
FKLOGUHQ¶VDFWLRQV This PD\VXJJHVWWKDWFKLOGUHQ¶VEHOLHIOHGSDUHQWVWRVKRw more belief. 
+RZHYHULWLVDOVRSRVVLEOHWKDWSDUHQWVZHUHVLPSO\FRS\LQJWKHLUFKLOGUHQ¶VDFWLRQV
regardless of action type, since they did not show belief through their language as well. 
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Table 3 
Observed frequencies (top row, no brackets), expected frequencies (top row, in brackets), 
conditional probabilities (middle row) and adjusted residuals (bottom row) of parents' 
behavior types following WRGGOHUV¶ behavior types within 5 seconds, across all participants 
and conditions in Study 1. 
 Follows within 5 seconds 
 Parent 
 
Belief 
Language 
Disbelief 
Language 
Target 
Action 
Other 
Action 
Child     
Target Action 135(132) 
57% 
(0.65) 
10(12) 
4% 
(-0.95) 
79 (63) 
34% 
(3.20)* 
11(29) 
5% 
(-8.50)* 
Other Action 107(110) 
54% 
(-0.66) 
12(10) 
6% 
(0.79) 
36(52) 
18% 
(-4.34)* 
42(24) 
21% 
(3.98)* 
*p < .05. 
Study 2 
In Study 2, parents were instructed to produce specific, scripted, verbal joking, 
pretending, and literal play with their 20- to 24-month-olds. The goals of Study 2 were to 
determine whether (1) the results of Study 1 extend to a later stage of development, and (2) 
father-toddler interactions are comparable to mother-toddler interactions in these contexts. 
7RGGOHUV¶ODQJXDJHGHYHORSVH[SRQHQWLDOO\LQWKHVHFRQG\HDU Vocabulary increases 
dramatically from 16 to 24 months (Fenson, et al., 1994; Hamilton, et al., 2000). Due to this 
VKLIWWRGGOHUV¶MRNLQJDQGSUHWHQGLQJEHFRPHPRUHYHUEDO7RGGOHUVPLVODEHOREMHFWV as a 
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joke from 2 years, with jokes involving labelling one object as something very different (e.g., 
joking that a fork is a pig; Hoicka & Akhtar, 2011; McGhee, 1979). Toddlers also pretend 
through object substitution somewhat proficiently from 2 years when objects look dissimilar 
to the original objects, but have no obvious function, e.g., blocks (e.g., Elder & Pederson, 
1978; Fein, 1975; Jackowitz & Watson, 1980). Thus we sought to examine whether parents 
offer cues to distinguish verbal (rather than action-based) joking and pretending with older 
toddlers, following age-appropriate forms of joking (mislabelling objects) and pretending 
(object substitution where substitutes have no obvious function), and whether older toddlers 
use parental cues to distinguish verbal (rather than action-based) joking and pretending 
themselves.  
Additionally, fathers may provide more cues to distinguish joking and pretending as 
men may be more practiced at joking as they tell rehearsed jokes more often than women 
(Johnson, 1991). However, women tell more amusing personal anecdotes than men 
(Crawford & Gressley, 1991), and other studies of humor production do not find sex 
differences (e.g., Edwards & Martin, 2010), making it less clear if men really would be more 
practiced at being humorous. Additionally, fathers may provide fewer cues than mothers in 
general. While fathers produce infant-directed speech, which can scaffold infant language, 
WKHLUFXHVDUHOHVVH[DJJHUDWHGWKDQPRWKHUV¶(Fernald, et al., 1989). Thus it is unclear 
whether fathers or mothers will provide more cues. 
This study was not meant to directly replicate Study 1, but instead to examine whether 
parents continue to cue differences between joking and pretending at a later stage of 
development, using developmentally appropriate forms of joking and pretending. An 
interesting aspect of this stage of development is that children use object substitution both to 
pretend and to joke. However, they are quite discerning about the types of object substitutes 
that work well in pretense versus joke contexts. For instance, a 2-year-old would use a non-
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descript object, such as a block, to represent a cup during pretend play, but would not use an 
object distinct in form and function, e.g., a car, as a cup (e.g., Elder & Pederson, 1978; Fein, 
1975; Jackowitz & Watson, 1980). In contrast, a 2-year-old would joke that a car is a cup, an 
object distinct in form and function, although it is less clear whether a 2-year-old would joke 
that a non-descript object, such as a block, is a cup (e.g., Hoicka & Akhtar, 2011; McGhee, 
1979). 
Method 
Participants. A separate group of 40 parents (19 fathers) and their toddlers (age M = 
21 months, 12 days, range = 19 months, 22 days to 24 months 13 days; 21 boys) participated. 
Three additional participants were excluded because of poor sound quality on the videos. One 
child was Black and all other children were Caucasian. Most parents had a university degree. 
Participants were recruited as in Study 1. 
Materials. The objects were different depending on the condition. In the literal trials, 
the objects matched the words (e.g., toy horse for horse). In the pretend trials, the objects 
were non-descript items such as blocks and sponges (e.g., round block for horse). In the joke 
trials, the objects were mismatched items (e.g., coat for horse). See Appendix C for the object 
and label pairings by condition. Two Sony digital camcorders recorded the sessions. 
Design. This was a within subjects design. The independent variable was the Trial 
Type: Joke, Pretend, or Literal. The dependent variables included SDUHQWV¶%HOLHIDQG
'LVEHOLHI/DQJXDJHSDUHQWV¶DQGFKLOGUHQ¶V%HOLHIDQG'LVEHOLHI$FWLRQV; DQGFKLOGUHQ¶V
Negation. Two other independent variables were examined for whether they interacted with 
WKHPDLQLQGHSHQGHQWYDULDEOHFKLOGUHQ¶VDJHDQGSDUHQWV¶JHQGHUFor the LSA examining 
WKHHIIHFWVRISDUHQWFXHVRQFKLOGUHQ¶VEHKDYLRUVWKHLQGHSHQGHQWYDULDEOHVZHUHWKHSDUHQW
dependent variables listed above. The dependent variables were the child dependent variables 
listed above, as well as Other Language as a control for Negation. For the LSA examining the 
RUNNING HEAD: DISTINGUISHING JOKING AND PRETENDING  24 
 
HIIHFWVRIFKLOGUHQ¶VFXHVRQSDUHQWV¶EHKDYLRUVWKHLQGHSHQGHQWDQGGHSHQGHQWYDULDEOHV
were reversed. See next section for counter-balancing. 
Procedure and Counterbalancing. Before the study, parents were only told that we 
were interested in discovering how parents and toddlers interact when playing, including 
when the joke and pretend. Therefore the hypotheses were not disclosed. Each parent and 
toddler sat at a table, with the parent in a chair, and the toddler in a high chair. Parents acted 
out four blocks of four 30-second trials for a total of 16 trials: Joke, Pretend, Literal, and a 
fourth literal trial type run for another study (see Study 1). Before each block parents were 
WROG³,¶PJRLQJWR JLYH\RXIRXUWR\VRQHDWDWLPH´(DFKREMHFWHJeither shoe, block, or 
chicken, for Literal, Pretend, and Joke trials respectively) was given with an accompanying 
7DUJHW6HQWHQFHHJ³7KLVLVDVKRH´ Parents were then told either/LWHUDO³)Hel free just 
WRSOD\ZLWKWKHWR\ZLWK\RXUFKLOG´3UHWHQG³7KLVWLPHLW¶VSUHWHQGLQJ6RLI\RXFRXOG
SUHWHQGWKDWWKLV>SRLQWWRREMHFWHJEORFN@LVWKLV>SRLQWWRWDUJHWVHQWHQFHHJ³7KLVLVD
VKRH´@WKHQWKDWZRXOGEHJUHDW´-RNLQJ³7KLVRQH¶VMRNLQJVRLW¶VDERXWXVLQJWKHREMHFWVLQ
the wrong way, so if you could joke around that this [point to object, e.g., chicken] is this 
>SRLQWWRWDUJHWVHQWHQFHHJ³7KLVLVDVKRH´@WKHQWKDWZRXOGEHJUHDW´Children could 
have heard these general instructions, however it seems unlikely that they would show a 
JUHDWHUHIIHFWWKDQSDUHQWV¶LQWHUDFWLRQVWKHPVHOYHV:HFKRVHWRLQVWUXFWSDUHQWVWRVKRZ
their excitement and happiness in the Literal condition to control for positive emotion across 
conditions, as in Study 1. 
Joke, Pretend, Literal, and the other literal trial types were crossed with each of four 
sets of object labels, each set containing the word for an animal, vehicle, clothing item, and 
eating item. Parents acted out a subset of all the condition-label set pairings. For example, 
one parent would joke with Set 1 &RDW ´+RUVH´&KLFNHQ ´+DW´3ODWH ´7UDLQ´
$LUSODQH ´6SRRQ´, then play literally (not analyzed) with Set 2 (Cow, Shoe, Boat, Fork), 
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play literally (analyzed) with Set 3 (Dog,  Bib, Bus, Cup), then pretend with Set 4 (Round 
%ORFN ´3LJ´%DWK6FUXE ³6RFN´6FUXQFK\+DLUEDQG ³&DU´6TXDUH%ORFN ³%RZO´. 
However, another parent would play literally (analyzed) with Set 4 (Pig, Sock, Car, Bowl), 
then joke with Set 3 &RDW ´'RJ´&KLFNHQ ´%LE´3ODWH ´%XV´$LUSODQH ´&XS´, then 
pretend with Set 2 5RXQG%ORFN ´&RZ´%DWK6FUXE ³6KRH´6FUXQFK\+DLUEDQG 
³%RDW´6TXDUH%ORFN ³)RUN´, then play literally (not analyzed) with Set 1 (Horse, Hat, 
Train, Spoon; see Appendix D for counterbalancing). Across all parents, all combinations of 
condition, set, and order were acted out. Parents and children played with distractor objects 
for one minute between blocks (same as Study 1).  
Target Sentences were the same across trials to allow experimental control ± any 
differences in responses by parents and children would be attributed to how the Objects 
related to the Target Sentences, and could not be attributed to the Target Sentences alone. 
While using specific sentences and objects gave better experimental control, it may have 
made the study less naturalistic. However, this was deemed necessary to avoid confounds, 
and parents appeared to act naturally throughout the study regardless. Since these instructions 
were written on paper kept away from the child, children only learned about this information 
through their parents. Additionally, it was necessary to use different objects across 
FRQGLWLRQV)RULQVWDQFHLIZHKDGXVHGDWR\WUDLQIRUWKHWULDOZKHUHSDUHQWVVD\³7KLVLVD
train.´LQDll three conditions, it would be difficult for a parent to pretend or joke that it was a 
train because it literally was a train. Thus we chose, in this instance, a scrunchy hairband in 
the pretend condition, and a plate in the joke condition, so that utterances would be non-
literal. Additionally, objects were different in the pretend and joke conditions because, as 
stated in the introduction for Study 2, 2-year-olds pretend with objects with no obvious 
functions, therefore a plate would not be suitable for pretending. Similarly, we discussed that 
2-year-olds joke with objects that are quite distinct, e.g., joking a car is a hat, and using an 
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ambiguous object therefore might not have good comedic effect. It was thus necessary to use 
different types of objects so that parents could express pretending and joking in age-
appropriate ways. 
Parents were not told to make, or refrain from making, additional actions or 
utterances. Children played with the objects with their parents throughout the trials. The 
experimenter sat behind an occluder during the trials, and switched the objects between trials. 
Study 2 was filmed as in Study 1. 
Coding. Videos were coded as in Study 1. Belief Language and Actions involved 
showing belief that the Target Sentence related to the object. For example, parents could 
show belief that any object is a shoe (shoe, chicken, block) by putting the object on their foot, 
RUVD\LQJHJ³,¶PW\LQJXSWKHODFHV´ Disbelief language and actions involved showing 
disbelief that the Target Sentence related to the object. For example, parents could show 
disbelief that any object is a shoe (shoe, chicken, block) by putting the object on their head, 
RUE\VD\LQJ³7KDW¶VQRWDVKRH´%HOLHIDQG'LVEHOLHI$FWLRQVFRXOGDOVREHPRGHOOHGDV
gestures, e.g., PDNLQJD³VSRRQLQJ´JHVWXUHWRRQH¶VPRXWK. Belief and Disbelief Actions 
were coded in regards to the label given ± to see how much parents did or did not endorse the 
label within each condition. Table 1 gives examples of Belief and Disbelief Language and 
Actions produced. 
A second-FRGHUEOLQGWRWKHVWXG\¶VK\SRWKHVHV, coded 6 (15%) transcripts for 
language, and 6 YLGHRVIRUSDUHQWV¶DQGWRGGOHUV¶DFWLRQV$JUHHPHQWZDVYHU\JRRGk 
= 0.88, for language, and k = 0.94 for actions. 
Results and Discussion 
Up to 160 trials could be analysed per condition (40 participants X 4 trials). Across 
participants, 7 Joke trials and 9 Literal trials were not completed, leaving 153 Joke trials, 160 
Pretend trials, and 151 Literal trials for analysis. LMM ZHUHXVHGIRUSDUHQWV¶%HOLHI
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Language. LMEM were used for all other analyses, as the mean number of occurrences of the 
behaviors was under one for each trial. For all analyses, the Independent Variable was Trial 
Type (Joke, Pretend, Literal). Difference contrasts compared Pretend to Joke and Literal 
trials. For all analyses, Participant Number and Object Label were assigned as random 
variables. Interactions of Trial Type with Child *HQGHU3DUHQW*HQGHUDQG&KLOG$JH
months, >21 months when using LMEM, based on the median) were included in final models 
if significant.  
Parents 
Language. Figure 2 VKRZV3DUHQWV¶%HOLHIDQG'LVEHOLHILanguage by Trial Type 
(Joke, Pretend, Literal). The best model, loglik = -2029.60, N = 928, Pseudo-R2 = 0.46, found 
an interaction between Language Type (Belief, Disbelief) and Trial Type (Joke, Pretend), OR 
= 4.13, t = 4.28, p <  .0001, and between Language Type and Trial Type (Pretend, Literal), 
OR = 2.83, t = 3.13, p = .0018. There were no significant interactions with Child Age, Child 
Gender, or Parent Gender. 
 
* p < .05 
Figure 2. 3DUHQWV¶PHDQQXPEHURI utterances expressing Belief and Disbelief Language by 
Trial Type (Joke, Pretend, Literal) in Study 2. Errors bars represent standard errors. 
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To follow up these interactions we tested Belief and Disbelief Language separately. 
The best model for Belief Language, loglik = -1096.30, N = 464, Pseudo-R2 = 0.02, found 
Pretend trials elicited more Belief Language than Joke trials, OR = 1.76, t = 2.15, p = .0323. 
No difference was found between Literal and Pretend conditions. The best model for 
Disbelief Language, loglik = -783.62, N = 464, Pseudo-R2 = 0.19, found Joke trials elicited 
more Disbelief Language than Pretend trials, OR = 2.24, t = 6.52, p <  .0001, and Pretend 
trials elicited more Disbelief Language than Literal trials, OR = 1.87, t = 5.04, p < .0001. 
Additionally, Parents produced more Belief than Disbelief Language overall, OR = 85.01, t = 
32.63, p < .0001, regardless of Trial Type. 
Actions. Figure 3 VKRZVSDUHQWV¶%HOLHIDQG'LVEHOLHI$FWLRQVE\7ULDO7\SH7KHEHVW
model, loglik = -438.14, N = 928, found an interaction between Action Type (Belief, 
Disbelief) and Trial Type (Joke, Pretend), OR = 4.99, p = .0013. There was no interaction 
between Action Type and Trial Type (Pretend, Literal). There were no significant interactions 
with Child Age, Child Gender, or Parent Gender. 
 
* p < .05 
Figure 3. Percentage of trials during which parents and toddlers made Belief and Disbelief 
Actions by Trial Type (Joke, Pretend, Literal) in Study 2. No errors bars are used as 
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statistics are non-parametric. Numbers over bars indicate the total number of trials 
that actions were identified out of the total number of trials analyzed for the Trial 
Type (in the legend). 
 
To follow up the interaction we tested Belief and Disbelief Actions separately. The 
best model for Belief Actions, loglik = -296.23, N = 464, found no effect of Trial Type. The 
best model for Disbelief Actions, loglik= -146.15, N = 464, found Joke trials elicited more 
Disbelief Actions than Pretend trials, OR = 5.64, p < .0001. Joke trials also elicited more 
actions of either type (Belief and Disbelief combined) than Pretend trials, OR = 2.68, p < 
.0001. Parents were more likely to produce Belief than Disbelief Actions overall, OR = 22.32, 
p < .0001, regardless of Trial Type.  
As in Study 1, and as predicted, parents showed more disbelief and less belief, 
through language, and more disbelief through their actions, when joking versus pretending. 
Thus even when joking and pretending are quite similar in form, parents still distinguish 
them. Replicating the object substitution results of Study 1, parents also showed more 
disbelief through their language when pretending versus playing literally, suggesting disbelief 
in the pretend premise to some extent. Again, as in Study 1, parents showed more belief than 
disbelief, both through language and actions, across all three conditions, even joking. Parent 
gender had no effect on how parents display their belief or disbelief. Therefore mothers and 
fathers interact in similar ways with their toddlers in terms of distinguishing contexts. 
Children  
Negation. The best model, loglik = -190.18, N = 464, found Pretend trials (22%; 
35/160 trials) were more likely to elicit Negation than Literal trials (10%; 15/151 trials), OR 
= 5.06, p = .0078. There was no main effect distinguishing Pretend and Joke trials (24%; 
36/153 trials). However, an interaction found Joke trials were more likely to elicit Negation 
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than Pretend trials for older compared to younger children, OR = 4.18, p = .0252. 
Additionally, older children were more likely to produce Negation than younger children 
overall, OR = 2.98, p = .0491. There were no significant interactions with Child Gender  or 
Parent Gender. 
Actions. Figure 3 VKRZVFKLOGUHQ¶V%HOLHIDQG'LVEHOLHI$FWLRQV by Trial Type. The 
best model, loglik = -489.17, N = 928, found an interaction between Action Type and Trial 
Type (Joke, Pretend), OR = 3.08, p = .0029, and between Action Type and Trial Type 
(Pretend, Literal), OR = 11.07, p < .0001. There were no significant interactions with Child 
Age or Parent Gender. 
To follow up the interactions we tested Belief and Disbelief Actions separately. The 
best model for Belief Actions, loglik = -275.48, N = 464, found Pretend trials elicited more 
Belief Actions than Joke trials, OR = 2.39, p = .0016, and Literal trials elicited more Belief 
Action than Pretend trials, OR = 2.61, p < .0001. The best model for Disbelief Actions, loglik 
= -213.44, N = 464, found Pretend trials elicited more Disbelief Actions than Literal trials, 
OR = 4.40, p < .0001.  
Children were more likely to produce Belief than Disbelief Actions overall, OR = 
2.86, p < .0001, regardless of Trial Type. Pretend trials were more likely to elicit actions of 
either type than Joke trials for girls compared to boys, OR = 2.63, p = .0109. Pretend trials 
were more likely to elicit Belief Actions than Joke trials for girls compared to boys, OR = 
4.11, p = .0109.  
As in Study 1, and as predicted, toddlers showed less belief when joking versus 
pretending by producing fewer Belief Actions in the joking context. Older toddlers also 
showed more disbelief by producing more Negation during joke versus pretend contexts. For 
the first time, children showed more disbelief, and less belief, during pretend versus literal 
trials. In particular, they were more likely to produce Disbelief Actions and Negation, and 
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less likely to produce Belief Actions during pretend versus literal trials. This could be due to 
the pretense type (object substitution focussing on language). However children did not 
object verbally in Study 1 to a similar type of pretense (object substitution focussing on 
actions). Given that older toddlers were more likely to use negation than younger toddlers, 
this may be due to toddlers becoming better at using negation with age (e.g., Choi, 1988; 
Hummer, et al., 1993). 
Parent gender had no effect on how children display their belief or disbelief. Girls 
were more likely to perform actions in general during pretend versus joke trials than boys. 
Crucially, however, there was no 3-way interaction of child gender, trial type, and action 
type. Thus child gender had no effect on how children assigned belief and disbelief to joke 
and pretend contexts. Rather, girls were perhaps more engaged in pretending than joking 
compared to boys. The only effects of cKLOGUHQ¶VDJHKDGWRGRZLWKQHJDWLRQ&KLOGUHQRIDOO
ages were more likely to use negation during literal versus pretend trials. However, older 
children were more likely to use negation in general, and, more specifically, older children 
were also more likely to use negation during joke versus pretend trials. This may mark either 
a better awareness of the distinction of joking versus pretending older toddlers, a better 
ability to use negation appropriately (e.g., Choi, 1988; Hummer, et al., 1993), or both. 
Parent-Child Interactions.  
In order to examine more closely KRZFKLOGUHQZHUHDIIHFWHGE\SDUHQWV¶FXHVa LSA 
was run as in Study 1. Table 4 shows the total frequency, expected frequency, conditional 
probability, and residual of each Behavior Type following each Behavior Type . We 
H[DPLQHGWKHHIIHFWVRISDUHQWV¶%HOLHIDQG'LVEHOLHILanguage and Actions on FKLOGUHQ¶V
Belief and Disbelief Actions, and Negation, as these were used by parents and children to 
distinguish trials. We collapsed Target Sentences with Belief Language as in Study 1. We 
also included FKLOGUHQ¶V2WKHU8WWHUDQFHVQRQ-negation) as controls for Negation. The 
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distribution of behaviors in Table 4 was different than would be expected by chance alone, 
Ȥ2(16) = 37.22, p < .01. 
Children were more likely to perform Belief Actions after parents performed Belief 
Actions, but less likely after parents produced Disbelief Language. Children were less likely 
to produce Negation after parents produced Belief Language. Additionally, children were less 
likely to produce Other Utterances after parents produced Belief Actions, but more likely 
after parents produced Disbelief Statements.  
As in Study 1, parental cues appear to influence FKLOGUHQ¶Vbehaviors. Specifically, 
FKLOGUHQ¶VDELOLW\WRGLVWLQJXLVKMRNHSUHWHQGLQJDQGOLWHUDOFRQWH[WVWKURXJKBelief Actions 
and Negation could be explained by children responding to parental cues. Additionally, just 
as children in this age range are becoming better at using Negation themselves, they may also 
EHEHFRPLQJEHWWHUDWLQWHUSUHWLQJRWKHUV¶'LVEHOLHI/DQJXDJHVLQFHFKLOGUHQGLGQRWUHVSRQG
to this in Study 1. ,WLVLQWHUHVWLQJWKDWSDUHQWV'LVEHOLHI/DQJXDJHHQFRXUDJHGFKLOGUHQ¶V
Other Language, while Belief Language discouraged it. This converges with evidence that 
Disbelief Language encourages toddlers to talk in general (Hoicka, et al., 2008), and adds to 
this evidence by VKRZLQJEHOLHIWKURXJKDFWLRQVGLVFRXUDJHVWRGGOHUV¶JHQHUDOWDON
Therefore Disbelief Language may be a good way to engage toddlers in conversation more 
generally. $GGLWLRQDOO\FKLOGUHQ¶V'LVEHOLHI$FWLRQVZHUHQRWH[SODLQHGE\WKHPRGHO
Children may have picked up on other parental cues not coded in this study, or they may have 
noticed differences in contexts on their own. 
In order to examine whether child also influenced their parents, we examined the 
HIIHFWVRIFKLOGUHQ¶VEHKDYLRUVRQSDUHQWV¶EHKDYLRUV. The distribution of behaviors in Table 5 
was different than would be expected by chance alone, Ȥ2(16) = 27.49, p < .05.  
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Table 4 
Observed frequencies (top row, no brackets), expected frequencies (top row, in brackets), 
conditional probabilities (middle row) and adjusted residuals (bottom row) of WRGGOHUV¶
behavior types following SDUHQWV¶behavior types within 5 seconds, across all participants 
and conditions in Study 2. 
 Follows within 5 seconds 
 Child 
 
Belief 
Action 
Disbelief 
Action 
Negation 
Other 
Language 
Parent     
Belief Language 240(229) 
24% 
(1.42) 
74(67) 
8% 
(1.34) 
108(128) 
11% 
(-3.47)* 
564(562) 
57% 
(0.21) 
Disbelief Language 29(50) 
13% 
(-4.83)* 
12(15) 
6% 
(-0.90) 
37(28) 
17% 
(1.72) 
138(123) 
64% 
(2.08)* 
Belief Action 80(64) 
29% 
(2.26)* 
15(19) 
5% 
(-1.15) 
43(36) 
16% 
(1.31) 
138(157) 
50% 
(-2.78)* 
Disbelief Action 0(6) 
0% 
(NA) 
2(2) 
7% 
(0.11) 
7(3) 
26% 
(1.43) 
18(15) 
67% 
(0.95) 
*p < .05. 
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Table 5 
Observed frequencies (top row, no brackets), expected frequencies (top row, in brackets), 
conditional probabilities (middle row) and adjusted residuals (bottom row) of SDUHQWV¶ 
behavior types following WRGGOHUV¶ behavior types within 5 seconds, across all participants 
and conditions in Study 2. 
 Follows within 5 seconds 
 Parent 
 
Belief 
Statement 
Disbelief 
Statement 
Belief 
Action 
Disbelief 
Action 
Child     
Belief Action 217(201) 
74% 
(2.15)* 
22(43) 
7% 
(-5.35)* 
55(47) 
19% 
(1.36) 
0(3) 
0% 
(NA) 
Disbelief Action 70(579) 
61% 
(-1.92) 
23(17) 
20% 
(1.48) 
19(18) 
17% 
(0.18) 
3(1) 
2% 
(1.00) 
Negation 81(90) 
61% 
(-1.92) 
26 (19) 
20% 
(-1.52) 
22(21) 
17% 
(0.24) 
3(2) 
2% 
(0.88) 
Other Language 621(619) 
69% 
(0.24) 
139(131) 
15% 
(1.14) 
134(144) 
15% 
(-1.53) 
11(11) 
1% 
(0.18) 
*p < .05. 
Parents were more likely to say Belief Statements and less likely to say Disbelief 
Statements than chance within 5 seconds of children producing Belief Actions. 3DUHQWV¶
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actions were not affected by children. This may suggest that SDUHQWVUHLQIRUFHGFKLOGUHQ¶V
belief actions by expressing more belief, and avoiding expressing disbelief. 
General Discussion 
3DUHQWV¶([SOLFLW&XHV 
Our first goal was to determine whether parents give explicit cues to help toddlers 
distinguish joke and pretend intentional contexts. Across both studies, parents showed more 
disbelief, or less belief, through their language and actions when joking versus pretending. 
Therefore both studies show that in multiple contexts (action play, verbal play), with multiple 
types of joking and pretending, and multiple age groups (spanning 16 to 24 months), parents 
give explicit cues to distinguish joke and pretend intentional contexts. These findings 
converge with theoretical definitions of joking and pretending, which suggest pretending 
follows conventions given some assumptions, while joking can simply involve breaking 
conventions (e.g., Hoicka & Gattis, 2008; Hoicka, et al., 2008; Nichols & Stich, 2003). These 
findings also extend research suggesting parents show disbelief when joking, but perhaps not 
when pretending (Hoicka & Gattis, 2012; Hoicka, et al., 2008; Lillard, et al., 2007; Lillard & 
Witherington, 2004).  
It was not our goal to determine whether parents cue the differences between joking 
and pretending more or less alongside development. Rather, the goal was to see whether cues 
exist for different stages of development. However, it is interesting to note that parents cued 
the difference between joking and pretending, regardless of WRGGOHUV¶age. Indeed, within each 
study, there were no effects of WRGGOHUV¶DJH on parentV¶ use of cues. This suggests there are 
no clear developmental changes in parental cuing in the 2nd year. However, future research 
could compare parental cuing in a larger age range. 
One question is whether parents showed more disbelief and less belief when joking 
versus pretending because parents were instructed to do an action/use an object the wrong 
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way. We chose these instructions to clarify the instructions for the jokes. This may have led 
them to highlight the broken conventions with increased disbelief and decreased belief. While 
this is possible, two arguments speak against this. First, in a book-reading study, parents who 
read a humorous book, but who were not given explicit instructions to say something wrong, 
nevertheless expressed more disbelief language than parents who read a literal book (Hoicka, 
et al., 2008). Therefore parents do spontaneously show more disbelief when joking, even 
without explicit instructions. Second, by giving parents explicit instructions to do the wrong 
thing, parents could equally have wanted to comply by joking more, and hence showing more 
belief in the acts (e.g., by repeating the jokes). In order to comply, they may also have 
avoided SHUIRUPLQJFRQYHQWLRQDODFWVHJVD\LQJ³7KDW¶VUHDOO\DVKRH´VLQFHWKH
instructions were to do the wrong thing, not to follow conventions. Thus the instructions 
could have made them show less disbelief (e.g., by avoiding conventional acts). Therefore it 
is also possible these instructions stopped parents form making as many belief or disbelief 
statements as they typically would. 
This data adds to research finding parents use implicit cues to express humor, 
including exaggerated infant-directed speech (IDS) and a rising linear contour (Hoicka & 
Gattis, 2012), and laughter (Mireault, et al., 2011). It also converges with research finding 
parents distinguish joking and pretending with implicit cues, including smiling, infant-
directed speech, and gaze to the child (Hoicka, 2015). However, in that study, it was 
suggested implicit cues were used for attention grabbing in difficult situations, and to express 
SRVLWLYHHPRWLRQPRUHJHQHUDOO\7KXVZKLOHLPSOLFLWFXHVPD\KHOSJXLGHWRGGOHUV¶DWWHQWLRQ
WKHH[SOLFLWFXHVPHDVXUHGLQWKLVVWXG\PD\JXLGHWRGGOHUV¶XQGHUVWDnding of joking and 
pretending. 
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&KLOGUHQ¶VResponses 
Our VHFRQGJRDOZDVWRGHWHUPLQHZKHWKHUSDUHQWV¶H[SOLFLWFXHVJXLGHWRGGOHUVWR
distinguish joke and pretend intentional contexts. Both studies suggest children, like parents, 
distinguish joking and pretending. Children were less likely to produce target actions during 
joke versus pretend trials in Study 1, and less likely to produce belief actions during joke 
versus pretend trials in Study 2. This extends research finding children are more likely to 
laugh when being read a humorous versus literal book (Hoicka, et al., 2008), and 
experimental evidence finding toddlers from 19 months distinguish jokes and mistakes 
(Hoicka & Gattis, 2008; Hoicka & Akhtar, 2011). This also converges with experimental 
research showing 2- and 3-year-olds are more likely to object to joking than pretending 
(Hoicka & Martin, 2015). 
Across both studies, SDUHQWV¶EHOLHI, through language or actions, increased the 
likelihood that children would perform target or belief actions, while in Study 2, SDUHQWV¶
disbelief language decreased the likelihood. *LYHQWKDWFKLOGUHQ¶VWDUJHWDQGEHOLHIDFWLRQV
were predicted by parental cues, the ability to distinguish these contexts appears to be directly 
related to parental cues. This research converges ZLWKHYLGHQFHWKDWSDUHQWV¶H[SOLFLWFXHV
help children learn in other contexts (Hoicka, et al., 2008; Mireault, et al., 2012; Nakamichi, 
in press; Reddy, 2001). Most relevantly, toddlers whose parents provide more pretense cues 
DWPRQWKVEHWWHUXQGHUVWRRGDGXOWV¶SUHWHQGDFWLRQVDWPRQWKV1DNDPLFKLLQSUHVV
Toddlers spoke more when parents produced more disbelief language during book reading, 
suggesting disbelief language encourages active engagement in toddlers, potentially 
providing active learning opportunities (Hoicka, et al., 2008). Finally, infants were more 
likely to laugh or re-produce strange actions when parents laughed (Mireault, et al., 2012; 
Reddy, 2001). 
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While children responded to joking and pretending, and to their parents cues, mostly 
in similar ways across both studies, there was one interesting area of development. Only 
toddlers in Study 2 UHVSRQGHGWRSDUHQWV¶GLVEHOLHIlanguage. It was also in this study that 
toddlers began to use negation appropriately (to distinguish pretend versus literal conditions, 
and older children did so to distinguish joking and pretending ± see next section). Thus it is 
SRVVLEOHWKDWFKLOGUHQXVHSDUHQWV¶FXHVWRGLVEHOLHI more as they get closer to 2 years, perhaps 
as they start to understand concepts relating to negation more generally (e.g., Choi, 1988; 
Hummer, et al., 1993). Future research should examine this possibility. 
Pretend versus Literal Trials 
At the outset, we suggested four possibilities for how parents might distinguish 
pretending versus playing literally. Parents might (1) show more disbelief as the acts 
technically break convention (e.g., Hoicka, et al., 2008); (2) show more belief as previous 
research suggests (e.g., Lillard, et al., 2007; Lillard & Witherington, 2004);  (3) show no 
difference in behaviors as pretending might be thought of as literal once the pretend context 
is established (Nichols & Stich, 2003; Sutherland & Friedman, 2012); or (4) a combination of 
differences in both directions as pretense both breaks convention (technically) and is 
FRQYHQWLRQDOLQRQH¶VLPDJLQDWLRQ at the same time (e.g., Hoicka, et al., 2008;  Nichols & 
Stich, 2003).  
Our results varied depending on the type of pretense used. In Study 1, when symbolic 
pretense was used, parents increased their use of belief language when pretending versus 
being literal, in line with findings from Lillard (Lillard, et al., 2007; Lillard & Witherington, 
2004). However, parents also increased their use of disbelief statements. Therefore parents 
appear to express symbolic pretending as both endorsing and breaking conventions at the 
same time (e.g., Hoicka, et al., 2008; Nichols & Stich, 2003). In contrast, in both studies, 
when object substitution pretense was used, parents increased their use of disbelief 
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statements, but showed no difference in their use of belief statements, nor in their use of 
target or belief actions (or their disbelief actions). Therefore parents appear to express object 
substitution pretending as breaking convention (although not to the same extent as joking, see 
above, e.g., Hoicka, et al., 2008; Nichols & Stich, 2003). This highlights potential ambiguity 
in describing different types of pretending under the same umbrella. One possible reason 
parents treated these two types of pretending differently is that parents may have seen 
symbolic pretense as more literally true than object substitution, since the features of 
symbolic pretense share more in common with the conventional acts, e.g., putting an empty 
FXSWRRQH¶VPRXWKLVVLPLODUWRWKHFRQYHQWLRQDODFWRISXWWLQJDIXOOFXSWRRQH¶VPRXWK
(symbolic). In contrast, putting a plastic WXEHDURXQGRQH¶VQH[WDVDVFDUImay seem more 
removed from convention (object substitution). A second possibility is that parents thought 
toddlers could grasp the representational nature of symbolic pretense better than object 
substitution, and so were more keen to emphasise the representational aspects of symbolic 
pretense (through belief language), instead of focussing on the fact that it technically breaks 
convention.  
It was not the case that parents only ever expressed pretending as more believable 
than literal play, seemingly going DJDLQVW/LOODUG¶VRULJLQDOILQGLQJV,WLVLPSRUWDQWWRQRWH
however, that Lillard, et al., (2007) and Lillard and Witherington (2004) never interpreted 
their findings as being related to belief or disbelief. Thus while parents made more references 
to the absent objects (e.g., cheerios) in their study, perhaps the references involved a 
combination of belief and disbelief language, HJ³,¶PJRLQJWRHDWFKHHULRV.´ ³,¶PQRW
really eating cheerios´ 
This research also extends findings that parents use a variety of other cues when 
pretending versus acting literally. These cues include exaggerating features of infant-directed 
speech, including mean pitch and pitch variation when pretending versus acting literal 
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(Lillard, et al., 2007; Reissland & Snow, 1996). Other cues include increasing the use of 
sound effects, gazing to the child, and, sometimes, smiling, when pretending versus joking 
(Lillard, et al., 2007; Lillard & Witherington, 2004).  
In Study 2, like parents, toddlers also viewed pretending as breaking convention more 
than literal play, with pretend trials eliciting more disbelief actions and negation, and fewer 
belief actions than literal trials. Therefore, even toddlers see object substitution pretense as 
breaking conventions to some extent. However, in Study 1, children did not distinguish these 
contexts, even during object substitution. Two possibilities could explain this discrepancy. 
First, older toddlers may find it easier to distinguish pretending and literal play than younger 
toddlers. In future, an experiment could be run between age groups to determine whether this 
is the case. Second, the object substitution used in Study 1 involved objects similar in shape 
to the literal objects (e.g., sticks for crayons), while the object substitution used in Study 2 
involved objects different in shape to the literal objects (e.g. scrunchy hairband for train). 
Thus perhaps toddlers in Study 1 did not notice the objects were unconventional, while the 
toddlers in Study 2 did. 
The Non-Literal World 
This research shows parents cue toddlers to information that is technically false, and 
toddlers pick up on the idea that information is false. Thus understanding that information 
can be false, may be scaffolded by parents. This exchange occurred most strongly in joking 
contexts. This suggests that, at least compared to pretend and literal contexts, joking provides 
the best introduction for children to engage with the non-literal world. This converges with 
theory suggesting humor should be cognitively easier to grasp than other forms of falsehood, 
including pretense, lying, metaphor, and irony; and a corpus analysis showing humor is more 
prevalent in books aimed at 1-year-olds than other forms of falsehood (Hoicka & Gattis, 
2008; Hoicka, et al., 2008), and research showing some understanding of humor is present in 
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the first year (Hoicka & Akhtar, 2012; Mireault, et al., 2012; Reddy, 2001). The current 
studies thus provide evidence that sharing humor could be the gateway to non-literal thought 
in early development. 
Complex Intentions 
The current research may highlight how toddlers come to understand and distinguish 
complex intentions. Understanding intentions is an important milestone which may allow 
toddlers to learn language, use artefacts, and hence allow cultural transmission (e.g., 
Tomasello, 2001). Research suggests toddlers understand intentions from 14 months (e.g., 
Carpenter, Akhtar, & Tomasello, 1998; Gergely, Bekkering, & Király, 2002; Meltzoff, 1995). 
However, while toddlers understand intentions to follow conventions early on, it takes them 
longer to understand intentions to break conventions. Toddlers do not understand intentions 
to joke until 25 months (Hoicka & Gattis, 2008), nor intentions to pretend until 36 months 
(Rakoczy, Striano, & Tomasello, 2004). Given the extensive cues parents produce for their 
toddlers, it is possible children need time to absorb this information in order to fully 
understand these types of intentions. 
Additionally, given that cues to joking were more overt than cues to pretending, this 
might explain why children need an additional year to understand intentions to pretend versus 
intentions to joke. The fact that parents produce more cues showing disbelief when joking 
versus pretending may help toddlers understand intentions to joke much earlier than 
intentions to pretend. Future research should explore this potential link. 
Conclusions 
This research found parents offer explicit cues to help distinguish joke and pretend 
intentional contexts. Parents showed more disbelief and less belief through their language and 
actions when joking versus pretending. Toddlers in both studies were also able to distinguish 
joke and pretend contexts through their actions. Toddlers showed less belief through their 
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actions during joke versus pretend contexts. In both studies, their ability to distinguish joking 
DQGSUHWHQGLQJFRXOGEHH[SODLQHGDWOHDVWLQSDUWE\WRGGOHUV¶UHVSRQVHVWRSDUHQWV7RGGOHUV
were less likely to perform actions suggesting belief when parents expressed less belief. 
Older toddlers were also less likely to produce actions showing belief when parents made 
utterances suggesting disbelief. This set of studies thus reveals a mechanism by which 
toddlers learn to distinguish joking and pretending. Parents offer cues to distinguish the 
intentions, and toddlers take advantage of these cues to perform behaviors which distinguish 
these intentional contexts. 
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Appendix A 
Target Sentences and Target Actions across Action Types (Joke, Pretend, Literal) for Study 
1. 
Set Target Sentence Target Actions & Objects 
  Literal Pretend Joke 
Washing ,¶PVTXHH]LQJRXWWKH
soap 
Squeeze bottle of 
liquid soap 
Squeeze empty 
bottle 
Squeeze bottle of 
liquid soap with 
elbows 
 ,¶PZDVKLQJP\KDQGV Wash hands in 
bucket of soapy 
water 
Pretend to wash 
hands in empty 
bucket 
Put foam on own 
nose from bucket 
of soapy water 
 ,¶PGU\LQJP\KDQGV Dry hands with 
towel 
Pretend to dry 
hands with 
towel 
Rub towel on own 
head 
Eating ,¶PJRLQJWRHDWWKLV Eat some 
cookies from 
plate 
Pretend to eat 
from plate 
Put rice cake 
pieces on own 
forehead 
 ,¶PSRXULQJP\VHOID
drink 
Pour orange 
drink from bottle 
into cup 
Pretend to pour 
a drink from 
empty bottle to 
empty cup 
Hold bottle of 
water over own 
head 
 ,¶PJRLQJWRKDYHD
drink 
Take a sip from 
cup of orange 
drink 
Pretend to have 
a sip from 
empty cup 
Put cup of water 
to elbow 
Dressing ,¶PSXWWLQJWKHKDWRQ Put hat on own Put sponge on Put hat under own 
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my head head own head arm 
 ,¶PSXWWLQJWKHVFDUI
around my neck 
Put scarf around 
own neck 
Put rubber tube 
around own 
neck 
Put scarf on top of 
own head 
 ,¶PSXWWLQJWKHJORYHV
on my hands 
Put glove on 
own hand 
Put plastic 
wallet on own 
hand 
Put glove on own 
elbow 
Coloring Here are some crayons Pick up crayon 
from table 
Pick stick up 
from table 
Hold crayon with 
elbow 
 This is how you color Coloring with 
colorful crayons 
on colored paper 
with lots of 
shapes 
Pretend to color 
with stick on 
white paper 
with one big 
shape 
Put white paper 
with one big 
shape on own 
head and color 
with black 
crayons 
 ,¶PFRORULQJLQWKH
shape 
Coloring in 
shapes with 
crayons 
Pretend to color 
with stick on 
white paper 
with one big 
shape 
Put crayon on 
own nose 
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Appendix B 
Counterbalancing of Study 1. 
 Trial 
 1 2 3 4 
Order     
1 Joke NA Literal Pretend 
 Washing Eating Dressing Coloring 
2 NA Pretend Joke Literal 
 Washing Eating Dressing Coloring 
3 Literal Joke Pretend NA 
 Washing Eating Dressing Coloring 
4 Pretend Literal NA Joke 
 Washing Eating Dressing Coloring 
5 Joke NA Literal Pretend 
 Eating Coloring Washing Dressing 
6 NA Pretend Joke Literal 
 Eating Coloring Washing Dressing 
7 Literal Joke Pretend NA 
 Eating Coloring Washing Dressing 
8 Pretend Literal NA Joke 
 Eating Coloring Washing Dressing 
9 Joke NA Literal Pretend 
 Dressing Washing Coloring Eating 
10 NA Pretend Joke Literal 
 Dressing Washing Coloring Eating 
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11 Literal Joke Pretend NA 
 Dressing Washing Coloring Eating 
12 Pretend Literal NA Joke 
 Dressing Washing Coloring Eating 
13 Joke NA Literal Pretend 
 Coloring Dressing Eating Washing 
14 NA Pretend Joke Literal 
 Coloring Dressing Eating Washing 
15 Literal Joke Pretend NA 
 Coloring Dressing Eating Washing 
16 Pretend Literal NA Joke 
 Coloring Dressing Eating Washing 
NA = Not Applicable; Literal page included for another study 
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Appendix C 
Target Sentences and objects across Trial Types (Joke, Pretend, Literal) for Study 2. 
Set Target Sentence Literal Object Pretend Object Joke Object 
1 This is a horse Horse Round block Coat 
 This is a hat Hat Bath scrub Chicken 
 This is a train Train Scrunchy hairband Plate 
 This is a spoon Spoon Square block Airplane 
2 This is a cow Cow Round block Coat 
 This is a shoe Shoe Bath scrub Chicken 
 This is a boat Boat Scrunchy hairband Plate 
 This is a fork Fork Square block Airplane 
3 This is a dog Dog Round block Coat 
 This is a bib Bib Bath scrub Chicken 
 This is a bus Bus Scrunchy hairband Plate 
 This is a cup Cup Square block Airplane 
4 This is a pig Pig Round block Coat 
 This is a sock Sock Bath scrub Chicken 
 This is a car Car Scrunchy hairband Plate 
 This is a bowl Bowl Square block Airplane 
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Appendix D 
Counterbalancing of Study 2. 
 Block 
 1 2 3 4 
Order     
1 Joke NA Literal Pretend 
 Set 1 Set 2 Set 3 Set 4 
2 NA Pretend Joke Literal 
 Set 1 Set 2 Set 3 Set 4 
3 Literal Joke Pretend NA 
 Set 1 Set 2 Set 3 Set 4 
4 Pretend Literal NA Joke 
 Set 1 Set 2 Set 3 Set 4 
5 Joke NA Literal Pretend 
 Set 4 Set 3 Set 2 Set 1 
6 NA Pretend Joke Literal 
 Set 4 Set 3 Set 2 Set 1 
7 Literal Joke Pretend NA 
 Set 4 Set 3 Set 2 Set 1 
8 Pretend Literal NA Joke 
 Set 4 Set 3 Set 2 Set 1 
NA = Not Applicable; Literal page included for another study 
 
 
